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An Examination of Psychometric Bias Due to Retesting on Cognitive
Ability Tests in Selection Settings
Filip Lievens
Ghent University
Charlie L. Reeve and Eric D. Heggestad
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Using a latent variable approach, the authors examined whether retesting on a cognitive ability measure
resulted in measurement and predictive bias. A sample of 941 candidates completed a cognitive ability
test in a high-stakes context. Results of both the within-group between-occasions comparison and the
between-groups within-occasion comparison indicated that no measurement bias existed during the initial
testing but that retesting induced both measurement and predictive bias. Specifically, the results suggest
that the factor underlying the retest scores was less saturated with g and more associated with memory
than the latent factor underlying initial test scores and that these changes eliminated the test’s criterion-
related validity. This study’s implications for retesting theory, practice, and research are discussed.
Keywords: retesting, cognitive ability tests, measurement bias, psychometric bias
The assessment of general cognitive ability (i.e., g) is common
in both educational and employment settings because of its robust
power to predict important, real-world criteria and the relatively
low costs associated with administration (Jensen, 1998; Kuncel,
Hezlett, & Ones, 2001; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Given the
high-stakes nature of such assessments, most professional testing
guidelines state that test takers should be provided with a reason-
able opportunity to retake the assessment (e.g., American Educa-
tional Research Association, American Psychological Association,
& National Council on Measurement in Education, 1999; U.S.
Department of Labor, 1978). Typically such recommendations are
based, appropriately, on the rationale that any single assessment is
subject to a variety of measurement errors, some of which may
lead to an underestimation of ability. Consistent with such recom-
mendations, retesting opportunities are a common part of selection
and promotion systems in large private (Muchinsky, 2004) and
public sector organizations (Wheeler, 2004). Likewise, students
may retake graduate-level entrance tests, such as the Graduate
Record Examination and Graduate Management Admission Test,
up to five times in a year (Wheeler, 2004).
Although retesting opportunities appear to be somewhat com-
mon and routinely recommended by professional guidelines, a
comprehensive understanding of the nature of retest effects is
lacking, and the psychometric “costs” of retesting are currently
unknown. That is, although research on practice and coaching
generally shows evidence for observed score changes (e.g., Briggs,
2001; Hausknecht, Halpert, Di Paolo, & Gerrard, 2007; Kulik,
Kulik, & Bangert, 1984; Lipsey & Wilson, 1993), measurement,
educational, and personnel scholars have only recently begun to
directly investigate the impact of repeated testing on the construct-
related (e.g., Reeve & Lam, 2005) and criterion-related validity of
cognitive ability tests (e.g., Hausknecht, Trevor, & Farr, 2002;
Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett, 2005). Moreover, there are multiple
perspectives on the nature of retest effects, with some researchers
arguing that retesting may enhance construct and predictive valid-
ity (e.g., Anastasi, 1981), whereas others have argued that retesting
may degrade construct- and criterion-related validity (e.g., Lubin-
ski, 2000). Thus, despite the pivotal role of measurement as the
foundation for organizational sciences (Vandenberg & Lance,
2000), whether retaking an ability test influences its measurement
properties, the meaning of test scores, and the generalizability of
test scores is not well understood.
Understanding the effects of retesting should be of concern to
personnel researchers and practitioners, given that the comparisons
of scores across individuals or groups require assumptions of
invariant measurement operations; that is, the fair use of test scores
requires that the tests do not suffer from test bias. As Vandenberg
and Lance (2000) noted, if the relations between the manifest
indicators and the latent constructs differ from one observation to
the next, comparing scores “may be tantamount to comparing
apples and spark plugs” (p. 9). As such, the purpose of the current
study is to address the psychometric implications of retaking a
cognitive ability test in a selection context. Specifically, we ex-
amine the question of measurement bias by testing the assumption
of measurement invariance within groups across occasions (i.e.,
comparison of the first and second administrations of the same test
to the same group of individuals) and between groups within
occasions (i.e., comparison of one-time test takers who differ in
whether they will retake the test). Second, we investigate the
question of predictive bias by comparing the predictive validity of
factor scores within groups (i.e., validity of scores derived from
first and second administrations of the same test) and between
groups (i.e., validity of scores from a group of one-time test takers
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in comparison with scores from a group of two-time test takers
derived from the same administration of a test).
To examine these issues, our study is situated in an actual
high-stakes selection context. Therefore, our study deals with
retest effects as they occur in such high-stakes contexts. This
actual selection context differs from the lab context of test–retest
reliability research, wherein all members of a representative sam-
ple of test takers retake the test after some interval. In a high-stakes
selection context, only the test takers who fail the first time are
strongly motivated to perform better on the retest (Hausknecht et
al., 2002). Logically, these test takers also performed worse on the
first administration.
Psychometric Bias
Psychometric bias is a statistical concept that refers to the
systematic over- or underestimation of true scores in a population
(Jensen, 1980). In particular, two forms of psychometric bias can
be identified that are relevant to the question of how retesting
impacts scores on tests—namely, measurement bias and predictive
bias. In this section, we discuss each of the two forms of psycho-
metric bias and the statistical procedures used to detect each.
Measurement Bias
Measurement bias occurs when the relationship between the
construct and the observed scores differs across two or more
groups. For example, a test would be said to suffer from measure-
ment bias if observed scores reflected general reasoning ability for
one group but acquired knowledge for another group (i.e., the test
items measured different constructs as a function of group mem-
bership). Likewise, measurement bias would also be evidenced if
a set of scores were reliable for one group of test takers but not for
another (i.e., measured the same construct to different degrees).
Generally speaking, measurement bias can be said to occur if the
test differentially denotes the target construct across different
groups or if the nature of the construct assessed by the test differs
across the groups (McArdle, 1998).
Measurement bias can be conceptualized as a set of questions
regarding the equivalence (or invariance) of different parameters
of a measurement model. Measurement invariance (MI) analyses
are accomplished through specification of a series of increasingly
restrictive factor models. Generally speaking, there are four tests
of MI (or what Little, 1997, referred to as Category 1 analyses) and
two additional tests to assess construct-level invariance (or what
Little referred to as Category 2 analyses). Only the Category 1 tests
pertain to the question of measurement bias per se. It is important
to note that each of these four tests assesses a different aspect of
measurement bias, each of which has different implications re-
garding test use.
First, one tests configural invariance by specifying that the
factor structure holds across groups (Vandenberg & Lance,
2000)—that is, that the set of indicators reflects the same number
of constructs and that each indicator relates to the same factors
across groups (i.e., that the factor loading pattern is equivalent).
Conceptually, this test assesses whether the set of manifest indi-
cators reflects the same constructs across groups (of course, a
complete test of construct validity requires much more evidence).
Second, one effects a test of metric invariance by constraining the
factor loadings of like indicators to be equal between groups (i.e.,
A  B), in addition to retaining all constraints for configural
invariance. As argued by Vandenberg and Lance (2000), testing
for metric invariance is more stringent than testing for configural
invariance in that it requires both the (unstandardized) factor
loadings and the factor loading pattern to be equal between both
groups. As such, this test assesses whether the same factor ac-
counts for the same amount of variance in each of its manifest
indicators across groups. Next, scalar invariance verifies that the
indicators’ intercepts are equal across the groups. This test deter-
mines whether the items are of equal difficulty across groups.
Finally, indicator uniquenesses are tested for invariance (i.e., the
jks are equal across groups). This test constrains the variance of
like indicator error terms to be equal across groups. Some have
interpreted this last test as a test of whether the items are equally
reliable across groups; however, it should be noted that an item’s
uniqueness term carries variance due to “random error” variance as
well as systematic variance not shared with other indicators in that
particular analysis (Crocker & Algina, 1986, p. 295; Cole &
Maxwell, 1985; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). Thus, although
changes in item reliability would result in noninvariance, a finding
of noninvariance does not necessarily imply differences in item
reliability (see Raykov, 2004, for a latent variable approach to
directly estimating internal consistency).
The failure of any one of these tests of invariance can be taken
as evidence of some form of measurement bias. However, the type
of bias implied differs. For example, metric bias implies that the
relationship between the manifest indicators and the latent factor
changes across groups; that is, the set of test items does not reflect
the construct to the same degree across groups. Conversely, scalar
bias suggests only that the items are of unequal difficulty across
groups; it does not suggest that the test measures different factors
across groups, nor that the items measure the same factors to
different degrees. Thus, these different aspects of measurement
bias have different implications for test use and interpretation.
Predictive Bias
Predictive bias is evidenced when different predictive validity
coefficients (or regression equations, when a differential prediction
framework is used) are observed for groups that differ on a specific
characteristic or trait. Said differently, predictive bias is essentially
an issue of whether the relationship between a predictor variable
and a criterion variable is moderated by a third variable—for
example, sex or age. In the case of retesting, predictive bias would
be evidenced by significantly different validity coefficients for
retest scores as compared to coefficients based on initial test
scores. That is, the moderator variable of interest is occasion (i.e.,
initial test vs. retest).
Tests for predictive bias can be conducted at either the observed
variable or the latent variable level of analysis. At the observed
level, observed test scores are correlated with the criterion for each
group separately, and the difference between the validity coeffi-
cients is statistically tested. Of course, for this test to be meaning-
ful, the equivalency of measurement operations across groups (i.e.,
MI) must first be established. Alternatively, one may ask whether
differences on the latent variables underlying observed scores are
differentially related to a criterion. In this case, one would test for
equivalence of the covariance term between the latent predictor
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variable and a criterion variable (either latent or observed). The
advantage of the latter type of analysis is that the covariance
between the substantive predictor construct and the criterion can
be assessed directly (i.e., variance due to other sources is not
included in the predictor variable).
Three Explanations of Retest Effects and Their
Implications for Psychometric Bias
Retest effects can be defined as test score changes after prior
exposure to an identical test or alternate form of the test under
standardized conditions (Lievens et al., 2005). Substantial research
has demonstrated the short-term effectiveness of practice and
coaching for inducing mean increases in observed scores (e.g.,
Briggs, 2001; Kulik, Bangert-Drowns, & Kulik, 1984; Kulik,
Kulik, & Bangert, 1984; Lipsey & Wilson, 1993). Although there
is variation in the size of retest effects across different tests and
across people, retest effects appear to be significant and robust. For
example, a meta-analysis by Kulik, Kulik, and Bangert (1984)
showed average increases of d  .42 for same-test retest effects
and d  .23 for parallel tests. A recent meta-analysis of
Hausknecht et al. (2007) confirmed these findings (d  .26).
Similarly, Salthouse, Schroeder, and Ferrer (2004) report 3-year
test–retest score gains on various ability tests ranging from .20 to
.41 standard deviation units.
Although a number of specific explanations for retest effects can
be found in the literature (Lievens et al., 2005; Messick & Junge-
blut, 1981; Sackett, Burris, & Ryan, 1989), they generally take on
one of three forms: (a) construct-relevant changes (i.e., an actual
increase in the target ability), (b) a reduction in debilitating
construct-irrelevant factors, and (c) increases in non-g test-specific
skills. We discuss each in turn below. The implications of each of
these three explanations with respect to psychometric bias are
summarized in Figure 1.
Explanation 1 argues that changes in scores reflect an actual
change in the underlying ability construct measured by the test. To
explain retest effects, then, one could posit that individuals learn
and profit from the testing experience itself, and thus their actual
ability levels increase, on average, across repeated testing sessions.
For example, the act of completing a test of physical fitness could
enhance one’s actual level of physical fitness. Explanation 1 is
consistent with the so-called testing effect, which has been studied
extensively in the cognitive and educational testing literatures. The
testing effect refers to the robust finding that the act of taking a
memory-based test not only assesses what people know but also
leads to later long-term retention of the material assessed (see
Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). The testing effect is well docu-
mented, as it was found for a variety of tests (free-recall tests,
multiple-choice tests, etc.) and for memorization of a diversity of
material (word lists, picture lists, textbooks, lectures, etc.). Ac-
cording to Roediger and Karpicke (2006), overlearning (i.e., the
test provides additional exposure to the material memorized),
effortful retrieval (i.e., the test leads to elaboration of the material),
and transfer-appropriate processing (i.e., the test requires the same
type of processing of the material as the operations engaged during
learning) provide theoretical explanations for the testing effect.
This perspective posits that score gains reflect real changes in
the underlying construct that are accurately assessed by the test.
Accordingly, there should not be measurement bias or predictive
bias, because retest scores reflect the same underlying construct to
the same degree as do initial test scores. Both initial and retest
scores reflect individual differences in the target ability equally
well and thus should not induce measurement or predictive bias.
While this explanation might be a viable possibility for assess-
ments whose variance is primarily attributable to physical skills,
acquired cognitive skills, declarative knowledge, or memory tests
(see the body of research on the testing effect), it seems rather
unlikely for manifest indicators that load highly on the g factor
(i.e., tests, items, or scales that are highly “g loaded”). That is, it
is unlikely that g is so malleable as to be enhanced by simple
practice (Messick & Jungeblut, 1981), especially given that inten-
sive long-term intervention programs do not appear to have any
lasting effects on measured intelligence (Jensen, 1998; Spitz,
Explanation 1: Retesting 
increases target construct; 
no measurement or 
predictive bias 
Explanation 2: Retesting 
reduces contamination; 
enhances measurement 
properties
Explanation 3: Retesting 
increases test-specific, 
non-g skills; induces 
measurement and 
predictive bias 
Measurement Model Measurement Model Measurement Model 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2
A1 = A2 A1 ≠ A2 A1 ≠ A2
= ≠ =
B B B
Criterion-Related Validity Criterion-Related Validity Criterion-Related Validity 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2
A1 = A2 A1 < A2 A1 > A2
= < =
B B B
Figure 1. Summary of predictions regarding measurement and predictive bias stemming from the three
explanations for retest effects. Group A1 reflects initial test scores of those who took the test twice. Group A2
reflects the retest scores of those who took the test twice. Thus, Group A1 and A2 reflect the same people but
different sets of scores. Group B reflects the test scores of one-time test takers (all of whom took the test at the
first session along with Group A1). An equals sign means that measurement invariance is posited, whereas a not
equal sign means that measurement noninvariance is posited.
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1986). Therefore, we believe that observed score increases asso-
ciated with retest effects on highly g-loaded assessments (e.g.,
general cognitive ability tests) likely reflect something other than
a true change in the underlying target construct.
Explanation 2 suggests that retesting leads to a reduction of
debilitating, construct-irrelevant influences that are present (or at
least more salient) during the initial testing session. For example,
Anastasi (1981) posited a test sophistication hypothesis, suggest-
ing that brief practice (e.g., an example set of items) may increase
the construct validity of ability tests by reducing confusion and test
anxiety. Similarly, retesting may evoke score gains to the extent
that the initial test functions, in essence, as a set of practice items.
Accordingly, this perspective posits that the relation between the
test items and the latent factors would be altered by retesting. For
example, if confusion and unfamiliarity were suppressing scores
during initial testing, we would expect the items on the initial test
to be less reliable and show lower factor loadings compared to
items in the retest condition. In the extreme case, the number of
factors reflected by the items and the factor loading pattern could
be altered. In terms of a between-persons comparison, it could be
posited that the scores for those who did poorly on the initial test
(and thus eventually went on to retest) were suppressed by con-
fusion and unfamiliarity, whereas those who did well the first time
did not suffer from such debilitating influences. Thus, we would
expect to see lower reliabilities and factor loadings for the (lower
scoring) group who eventually retested, compared to the (higher
scoring) group who did not go on to retest. Likewise, if this
argument has merit, we would expect the retest scores to yield a
higher predictive validity for g-loaded criteria (i.e., criterion mea-
sures that would load heavily on the g factor if included in a factor
analysis of ability scales) than the initial test scores, as the retest
scores are less influenced by construct-irrelevant factors and are
presumably better measures of g. Similarly, by extension to the
between-persons comparison, we would expect to see higher pre-
dictive validities for the scores from the group who did not go on
to retest than for the initial scores from the group who did go on
to retest.
Explanation 3 stems from Lubinski’s (2000) suggestion that
practice builds up “nonerror uniqueness” components of ability
tests—factors such as method-specific knowledge1 (aka, test-
wiseness), specific item content knowledge, or narrow skills
unique to the item content (e.g., memorization of numbers). That
is, in terms of Carroll’s (1993) three-stratum model of abilities,
Explanation 3 posits that practice due to retesting increases the
test-specific skills residing in the lowest level of the hierarchy of
cognitive abilities (Jensen, 1998, chapter 10; Te Nijenhuis, van
Vianen, & van der Flier, 2007). Supporters of this argument
contend that the non-g components underlying observed test scores
account for an increasing share of the variance across repeated
administrations, and, hence, the predictive validity of observed test
scores decreases (because the generalizability of test scores resides
predominantly in g). If this argument is true, we would expect to
observe evidence of measurement bias as well as predictive bias
across repeated administrations of the test. Specifically, this per-
spective suggests that initial test scores should be the better mea-
sure of g, whereas the retest scores reflect proportionally more
variance due to non-g factors. As a result, the relations between
test items and the general factor should be altered, and the predic-
tive validity of retest scores (which are less g loaded) should be
reduced compared to the initial test scores.
In summary, there are three basic explanations for retest effects,
each of which predicts a specific pattern of results concerning
measurement and predictive bias. These patterns are summarized
in Figure 1. Explanation 1 hypothesizes that retesting induces a
true change in general cognitive ability and thus predicts no
measurement or predictive bias. Explanation 2 hypothesizes that
retest effects occur because the initial testing session essentially
acts like an extended instruction set; therefore, retest scores should
be less contaminated (i.e., more g loaded) than initial test scores
and display higher predictive validity. Thus, Explanation 2 pre-
dicts that one should observe evidence of measurement and pre-
dictive bias when making across-occasion comparisons, with the
retest scores showing stronger external associations with g-loaded
measures. Explanation 3 hypothesizes that retesting increases the
test-specific, non-g components of the test. This explanation im-
plies that initial test scores are free from measurement bias and that
retesting induces measurement (and, consequently, predictive)
bias. Therefore, Explanation 3 also predicts evidence of across-
occasion measurement and predictive bias, but in this case the
initial test scores should show stronger external associations with
g-loaded measures than the retest scores.
Present Study
A critical concern with retesting in applied settings is the pos-
sibility that retesting can result in test bias. As such, the current
study is designed to specifically address two primary questions: (a)
To what degree does retesting alter the measurement properties of
a cognitive ability test, and (b) to what degree does retesting alter
the pattern of external correlates of test scores? To answer these
questions, the current study applies latent variable MI analyses and
predictive bias analyses to data derived from a cognitive ability
test included in a high-stakes testing setting (medical school ad-
missions testing). The results of these within- and between-groups
analyses are then compared to the three hypothesized patterns of
results explained above and summarized in Figure 1.
Method
Sample and Procedure
The total sample consisted of 941 candidates (359 men and 582
women) who attended the Medical and Dental Studies admission
1 We use the term method-specific knowledge in a general sense to
encompass all construct-irrelevant test-specific “knowledge” that is not
associated with the focal ability being measured. Although we recognize
that there are differences between concepts such as test-taking skills,
test-wiseness, test familiarity, and test-specific variance, all of these con-
cepts do share a common theme. Namely, all of these concepts reflect, in
various forms, a performance-facilitating factor that is theoretically inde-
pendent of the cognitive ability targeted by the test. Further, we acknowl-
edge that construct relevant is a relative term, one that is defined with
respect to the purpose of testing. In the current context, we are concerned
with the use of tests of general cognitive ability; thus, g is the focal
construct, and systematic sources of variance due to things such as item-
specific knowledge or format-specific skills would be considered nonfocal
facilitating factors.
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exam in the Flemish part of Belgium. The average age of the
candidates was 19 years 7 months (SD  1.8 years). This admis-
sion exam was organized by the government (there was no further
selection on the part of the universities) and was administered in a
large hall. A week after the exam, candidates obtained feedback on
their test scores. Candidates who did not pass could retake the test
battery. Two examinations were scheduled per year (at the start of
July and at the end of August). All 941 candidates in the July
session were first-time test takers. Of these, 178 subsequently
repeated the test in the August session (hereafter referred to as
Group A), whereas 763 did not repeat the test in the August session
(hereafter referred to as Group B). The data sets for the group of
repeat test takers are referred to as Group A1 and A2, where the
number indicates data based on the participants’ first attempt or
second attempt, respectively. Criterion data were available for 94
individuals from Group A and 518 individuals from Group B. With
this data set, we can make within-group across-occasion compar-
isons (i.e., Group A1 vs. Group A2) as well as a between-groups
within-occasion comparison (first-time test takers who differed in
whether they would retake the test; Group A1 vs. Group B). (Note
that cross-cohort comparisons could be made as well—e.g., Group
A2 could be compared to Group B—however, these tests are less
informative, as they confound variance due to group differences as
well as occasion-specific differences.)
Predictor Measures
The medical college admission exam consisted of a battery of
four ability tests (a general cognitive ability test, a visual
information-processing test, a memory association test, and a
pattern recognition test), two miniaturized work samples (a video-
taped lecture and a medical text), and two situational judgment
tests (these dealt with patient–physician interaction and team-
work). For test security reasons, we cannot mention the source of
the four cognitive ability tests. Interested researchers may contact
us to obtain more information.
The main focus in this study is on the general cognitive ability
test. Prior research documented the reliability (test–retest reliabil-
ity  .84) and predictive validity for grade point average (GPA;
r  .36) of this cognitive ability test in a medical student popu-
lation (Lievens, 2004; Minnaert, 1996). In this general cognitive
ability test, three types of items were used, all designed to tap
general inductive and deductive reasoning (i.e., g). There were 19
verbal items (e.g., verbal analogies), 19 numeric items (e.g., com-
pleting number series), and 16 symbolic reasoning items (e.g.,
symbolic analogies). Therefore, in both the July and the August
sessions, the general cognitive ability test consisted of 54 items.
However, in light of test security concerns, only 6 items of each
item type (18 in total) were administered on both testing occasions.
These 18 items were exactly the same across testing occasions.
Hence, this set of 18 items from the general mental ability test is
analyzed in the current study. Accordingly, we ensured that the test
was held constant across administrations and that score changes
could be ascribed solely to person-related changes. Although the
surface features of the items reflect three categories, a prior factor
analysis of the items confirmed that they all denote general rea-
soning ability (i.e., the eduction of relations and correlates, or g)
and do not share content-specific variance that might reflect group
factors. Thus, a single-factor model is used as the measurement
model for this study. Descriptive statistics for the raw test scores
(based on these 18 items) are shown in Table 1.
In addition to this general cognitive ability test, three specific
cognitive ability tests were used. The visual information-
processing test (32 items) measured the ability to quickly scan and
interpret complex figures. In the memory association test, charac-
teristics of 15 patients (i.e., name, age, job title, type of illness) had
to be memorized. The reproduction phase (which took place on
completion of the general cognitive ability test) contained 20
questions dealing with these patient descriptions. Finally, the pat-
tern recognition test measured the cognitive ability to determine
which simple figure was part of a complex figure. In particular, 50
complex figures were included, and, per complex figure, 5 possible
simple figures were presented. Note that these three specific cog-
nitive ability tests are not used as part of the primary MI analyses,
although we do use the scores from these other tests for additional
analyses.
Criterion Measures
GPA in medical school served as a measure of academic per-
formance. Participants’ GPA from the first 3 years of study
(known as the preclinical years) was obtained from university
records. Classes and exams tend to be largely theoretical in nature
(e.g., testing knowledge in the core science classes) during the first
3 years of studies. In Belgium, GPA is measured on a scale from
0 to 20, with higher scores indicating better grades.
To circumvent potential distortion effects caused by differences
in harsh or lenient grading policies between universities, we stan-
dardized individuals’ GPAs within each of the six universities
from which data were obtained. With respect to the reliability of
this criterion, we were able to correlate the GPAs from each year;
the average correlation was near .70. These values are similar to
the values found in a meta-analysis on the temporal stability of
GPA (Vey et al., 2003). Descriptive statistics for the standardized
GPA variable are shown in Table 1.
Analyses
Structural equation modeling analyses were conducted with the
AMOS software (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1996) through maximum-
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Observed Score
Variables
Group Variable M SD r
A1 Test (n  178) 6.77 2.16
3-year GPA (n  94) 0.47 0.96 .15
B Test (n  763) 9.29 2.27
3-year GPA (n  518) 0.11 0.93 .19**
A2 Test (n  178) 9.86 2.99
3-year GPA (n  94) 0.47 0.96 .01
Note. The test was computed as the total number of 18 items answered
correctly. Grade point averages (GPAs) are reported as the standardized
residuals after location was controlled. Standardization was performed on
the full sample, not within group. Group A1 data are the first session scores
of test takers who failed and retook the test. Group A2 data are the retest
scores of Group A1. Group B data are the first session scores of test takers
who did not retake the test.
** p  .01.
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likelihood estimation. Item parcels, rather than individual items,
were used as indicators in the measurement model. Item parcels
keep the requirements for sample size manageable, are more
reliable, and are more normally distributed than single items, yet
they still provide multiple indicators per latent construct (which is
not the case if full-scale scores are used; Bagozzi & Edwards,
1998). A “spiraling” assignment method was used to create six
item parcels containing one item of each of the three types of items
mentioned above. Given that candidates were selected on the basis
of a third variable (i.e., selected on the basis of a cutoff score
determined on an operational composite, which was a weighted
sum of the admission tests used), the raw variance–covariance
matrices were corrected for indirect range restriction (Thorndike’s,
1949, Case 3). All structural equation modeling analyses reported
are based on the corrected matrices.
Vandenberg and Lance (2000) suggested that overall model fit
should be assessed via a variety of indexes. Consistent with their
recommendation, we used the chi-square statistic as well as the
chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio, which ameliorates the chi-
square index’s sensitivity to sample size. We also used the com-
parative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the root-mean-square
error of approximation (Steiger & Lind, 1980). CFI values at or
above .95 are generally considered indicative of good fit (Hu &
Bentler, 1999), while .90 is often used as a lower bound for
claiming adequate fit. For the root-mean-square error of approxi-
mation, values smaller than .05 are indicative of good fit, and
values of .08 represent an upper bound for acceptable fit (Browne
& Cudeck, 1992). Although change in chi-square is often used to
detect a significant reduction in model fit (i.e., to determine non-
invariance), Cheung and Rensvold’s (2002) simulation study
showed this to be a poor index. Rather, on the basis of their
analyses, Cheung and Rensvold suggested that the criterion of
change in CFI greater than .01 is the most appropriate method to
detect noninvariance.
Results
Results of Measurement Bias Analysis
Our first question was whether retesting induces measurement
bias. Given our data, we were able to test for measurement bias
within and between groups. We first conducted a between-groups
test of MI using the data from the first session (i.e., Group A1 vs.
Group B). This analysis addresses the question of whether there
was bias at initial testing acting to suppress the scores of the group
of people who would eventually retest (largely because of their
lower scores at Time 1).
The MI results for the between-groups within-occasion analyses
are shown in Table 2. The results show that all Category 1 MI
assumptions were supported. In each case, the overall model fit
indexes indicated a good fit to the data, and the change in indexes
between each step of the Category 1 analyses suggested that the
additional restrictions did not lead to a significant reduction in fit
according to Cheung and Rensvold’s (2002) criterion (i.e., change
in CFI was never greater than .01). Thus, we conclude that metric
invariance did hold, as well as all other Category 1 tests. There-
fore, no measurement bias at Time 1 is indicated, which is con-
sistent with Explanation 1 and Explanation 3 and inconsistent with
Explanation 2 (as shown in Figure 1).
The Category 2 MI analyses for the between-groups within-
occasion comparison are shown at the bottom of Table 2. The
results indicate that the assumption of factor variance equality was
tenable. However, adding the structural restriction for invariant
factor means resulted in a less than adequate overall fit and a
significant decrement in model fit compared to the less restricted
model (CFI  .16). This confirms that the group of eventual
repeat test takers was of lesser average ability than the group of
one-time test takers. Factor mean estimates based on the final
well-fitting model (i.e., Model 5 in Table 3) were 1.74 for the
eventual retest group (Group A1) and 2.14 for the one-time group
(Group B). A possible criticism of these analyses is that Group B
included some people who essentially failed the test (i.e., were not
admitted to medical school) but did not retest. Because these
people were arguably more like those in Group A1, this might have
biased the results in favor of finding invariance. Thus, we redid
these analyses using only those individuals from Group B who
were actually admitted to medical school, thus eliminating those
from Group B who failed the test but did not retest. The results of
these MI analyses again confirm complete MI with respect to
Group A1.
Second, we conducted a within-group between-occasions test of
MI on the data from individuals who took the test on both occa-
sions (i.e., Group A1 compared to Group A2). This analysis
addresses the question of whether retaking the same test leads to a
change in the measurement properties of the test. The MI results
Table 2
Tests of Between-Groups Within-Occasion Measurement Invariance at Time 1 (Groups A1 and B) With Range-Corrected Data
Model df 2 (N  941) 2/df CFI RMSEA
RMSEA 95% CI
Lower Upper
Category 1 tests
1. Configural invariance 18 33.75 1.875 .998 .031 .014 .046
2. Metric invariance (A1  B) 23 88.95 3.867 .992 .055 .043 .068
3. Scalar invariance (A1  B) 28 93.49 3.34 .992 .050 .039 .061
4. Invariant uniqueness (	A1  	B) 34 140.22 4.124 .987 .058 .048 .068
Category 2 (structural) tests
5. Invariant factor variances (
jA1  
jB) 35 146.74 4.193 .987 .058 .049 .068
6. Invariant factor means (A1  B) 36 278.39 7.733 .971 .085 .076 .094
Note. CFI  comparative fit index; RMSEA  root-mean-square error of approximation; CI  confidence interval.
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for this analysis are shown in Table 3. The results suggest that
assumptions of metric and uniqueness invariance were not sup-
ported. For both of these tests, the changes in the CFI were greater
than .01, which exceeds Cheung and Rensvold’s (2002) criterion.
Thus, these analyses do not support the assumption of MI across
repeated administrations of the same test. Specifically, these re-
sults suggest that taking the test a second time altered the degree
to which the indicators loaded on the general factor as well as the
specific variance associated with each indicator. Because nonin-
variance was indicated, the Category 2 MI analyses are not directly
interpretable; thus, we make no further comment on those Cate-
gory 2 analyses. Generally, the results of our within-group
between-occasions MI analyses are consistent with Explanation 2
and Explanation 3 and inconsistent with Explanation 1, as shown
in Figure 1. Across the two sets of analyses, only Explanation 3
conforms to the entire pattern of results.
Results of Predictive Bias Analysis
To conduct the predictive validity analyses, we added the GPA
measure to the measurement model and allowed it to covary with
the general factor extracted from the ability test indicators. Spe-
cifically, we did this set of analyses three times (once for each
group). It should be noted that we did not conduct multigroup
structural equation modeling analyses in this case; rather, we fitted
the model to each group independently. The reason is that the
sample size for Group A was substantially smaller than for the MI
analyses, because only those individuals who actually entered
medical school (and finished at least the first 3 years) were
included. With such a limited sample size, any invariance analysis
would be significantly underpowered. Differences between corre-
lations were tested with the standard z test for differences between
independent (i.e., Group A2 vs. Group B) and dependent groups
(i.e., Group A1 vs. Group A2).
Results are shown in Table 4. The most meaningful result is the
within-group between-occasions comparison (Group A1 vs. Group
A2). As shown, the predictive validity of retest scores was null,
whereas the initial test scores showed a positive coefficient (r 
.19, though not statistically significant given the small sample
size). These results indicate that retesting induced a (negative)
predictive bias. This pattern of coefficients is especially telling
given that it was the retest scores on which members of Group A
were admitted to medical school, yet the validity resides in the
initial test scores. In this respect, the comparison between Group B
and Group A2 is also telling, as these are the test data on which
individuals from both groups were actually selected for medical
school. These results reveal that the general factor derived from the
retested data (i.e., Group A2) did not predict GPA (r  .00, ns),
whereas the general factor derived from the group who did not
retest (Group B) did predict GPA significantly (r  .48, p  .01).
However, this comparison should be interpreted cautiously given
preexisting differences among Groups A2 and B. Taken as a
whole, the pattern of results from the predictive bias analyses is
most consistent with Explanation 3, as shown in Figure 1.
Additional Analyses
Recall that Explanation 3 posits that practice builds up non-g,
nonerror variance components of ability tests. To further test
Explanation 3 and to better understand whether the g-factor scores
derived from a repeated test are comparable to those based on
initial test scores (i.e., amenable to the same substantive interpre-
tations), we conducted three additional correlational analyses. The
first two analyses drew on reference scores from the other parts of the
full test battery that was administered during the first session (see the
Method section). First, we correlated the latent factor with scores on
a memory test that was included in the full ability battery. Second, we
derived an independent g score based on the scale scores of the
remainder of the cognitive battery. To obtain this score, we submitted
data from the two other ability scales administered at Time 1 (the
pattern recognition test and the visual inspection test) to a principal-
factor analysis and retained the first unrotated principal factor. We
Table 3
Tests of Within-Group Across-Occasion Measurement Invariance (Groups A1 and A2) With Data Corrected for Range Restriction
Model df 2(N  178) 2/df CFI RMSEA
RMSEA 95% CI
Lower Upper
Category 1 tests
1. Configural invariance 18 53.20 2.96 .988 .075 .052 .098
2. Metric invariance (A1  A2) 23 94.25 4.10 .975 .094 .075 .114
3. Scalar invariance (A1  A2) 28 123.27 4.40 .967 .099 .081 .117
4. Invariant uniqueness (	A1  	A2) 34 169.21 4.98 .953 .107 .091 .123
Category 2 (structural) tests
5. Invariant factor variances (
jA1  
jA2) 35 170.49 4.87 .953 .105 .090 .121
6. Invariant factor means (A1  A2) 36 260.21 7.23 .922 .133 .118 .149
Note. CFI  comparative fit index; RMSEA  root-mean-square error of approximation; CI  confidence interval.
Table 4
Correlations Between General Factor and 3-Year GPA by
Group and Testing Session
Group
Correlation with 3-year GPA
Initial test Retest
A (n  94) .19 .00
B (n  518) .48** —
Note. As Group B did not retest, no correlation could be computed. GPA
 grade point average.
** p  .01.
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refer to this new variable as GCA to distinguish it from the latent
general factor derived from the target set of indicators.
The pattern of results shown in Table 5 is again most consistent
with arguments reflected in Explanation 3. On the one hand, the
correlation between the latent factor from our target set of indica-
tors and the GCA variable was the highest for the group of
one-time test takers (Group B) and the lowest for Group A2. On
the other hand, the correlation with memory increased on read-
ministration. That is, the correlation for the latent factor from the
target cognitive ability test was essentially independent of memory
on initial testing but became significantly correlated on retesting
(the correlation for Group A2 was significantly larger than the
correlations for Groups A1 and B, ps  .05). Further, the latent
factor derived from retest scores was correlated more strongly with
memory than it was with the GCA variable.
Finally, to further assess the degree to which the factor under-
lying variance in the retest scores was equivalent to the factor
derived from the initial testing, we used Jensen’s (1998) correlated
vectors method. This method has been widely used to assess the
degree to which the psychometric general factors assessed by
different tests are substantively the same g factor (Jensen, 1998).
To do so, we submitted the data from the set of six target indicators
to a principal-factor analysis and retained the first unrotated prin-
cipal factor. We did this separately for Groups A1 and A2 and then
correlated the two vectors of factor scores. Results showed that the
two sets of factor scores were correlated (r  .27), but to a rather
modest degree. To place this correlation in context, we note that
research examining the comparability of g scores obtained from
different combinations of test batteries and different methods of
factor analyses typically show correlations above .95 (Jensen,
1998). This further suggests that the nature of the factor reflected
by retest scores is not entirely the same as the one reflected by
initial test scores.
Discussion
Given the prevalence of retesting in selection contexts, it is
pivotal to better understand the nature of retest effects and their
implications for the use of test scores. This study takes an impor-
tant step in that direction by being the first to use a latent variable
approach in examining possible measurement and predictive bi-
ases due to retaking a cognitive ability test in a high-stakes context.
Specifically, we found evidence of measurement and predictive
bias in retest scores; that is, we found metric and uniqueness
noninvariance across repeated administrations of the test and ev-
idence that retesting eliminated the predictive validity of test
scores. These findings suggest that the scores based on the retest
were, to some degree, reflecting something different than scores
based on the initial assessment. Additionally, we found no evi-
dence for measurement bias between lower and higher scoring
groups on initial testing. It thus seems the test functioned the same
across groups on initial testing, apparently assessing some ability
factor that was generalizable enough to predict GPA. However, on
retesting, the construct validity of the test was altered, and thus its
criterion-related validity was compromised. Consistent with these
findings, the additional correlational analyses indicate that the
factor assessed by the cognitive ability test under investigation
changed. For example, similar to the results of Reeve and Lam
(2005), who found that the variance due to memory increased
reliably with each repeated administration of a test, the current
results suggest that the test became less g loaded on retesting and
became more associated with variance due to memory.
In addition to addressing a purely empirical question of whether
retesting alters the psychometric properties of an ability test, the
set of analyses conducted enabled us to test three possible expla-
nations for retest effects. Taken as a whole, the pattern of results
found in the current study is consistent with Explanation 3 and
inconsistent with the other two explanations. Explanation 3 states
that test score increases associated with retesting are likely due to
the unique, nonability variance components of the tests (Lubinski,
2000). Further, our results appear to be consistent with findings
from the practice effects literature (e.g., Coyle, 2006; Reeve &
Lam, 2007; Te Nijenhuis et al., 2007) demonstrating that score
gains are “hollow with respect to g” (Jensen, 1998, p. 308). That
is, score gains on cognitive ability tests are not g loaded; rather
than reflecting a generalizable ability component, they appear to
reflect a narrow ability component (e.g., memory). Because nar-
row ability components such as memory are generalizable only
with respect to very narrow criterion components (Reeve, 2004),
they typically fail to demonstrate criterion-related validity for
important real-world criteria. Our results appear to confirm this
notion, as the retest scores failed to demonstrate criterion-related
validity.
Implications for Practice and Research
At a practical level, our results raise concerns about the psy-
chometric impact of retesting on cognitive tests and call into
question some of the arguments justifying retesting. One justifi-
cation for retesting is that the initial test might have been biased
because test takers were suffering from a so-called deficit (e.g.,
lack of familiarity with the test or test anxiety). Therefore, retest-
ing should provide a more valid assessment of the candidates’
standing on the constructs of interest. However, contrary to those
propositions, this study found no evidence of any measurement
bias against lower scoring groups in the initial testing situation and
found that the initial scores, rather than the retest scores, yielded
predictive validity. Taken together, these two results do not pro-
vide support for the operational use of scores from repeated
cognitive ability tests when the same items are used in both
administrations. Future research should test whether the same
conclusions are valid for use of parallel (instead of identical) tests
in retesting.
Table 5
Correlations Between General Factor and Reference Variables
by Group
Group
Correlation with
memory Correlation with GCA
Initial test Retest Initial test Retest
A (n  176) .03 .29** .22* .14
B (n  573) .10
—
.40** —
Note. As Group B did not retest, no correlation could be computed.
GCA  first unrotated principal factor based on scores from the remainder
of the cognitive ability battery administered during the first session.
* p  .05. ** p  .01.
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We believe that our three general hypotheses for the changes in
observed scores associated with retesting (see Figure 1) are also
relevant for examining retest effects for tests other than cognitive
ability. However, at the same time, we emphasize that our con-
clusion that Explanation 3 predominates is only valid for cognitive
ability tests. Future research should test whether retest effects in
achievement and knowledge tests and in nonability tests (e.g.,
personality tests) lead to conclusions similar to those that we
reached on the basis of the current analyses. Regarding achieve-
ment and knowledge tests, we expect that Explanation 1 (testing
actually increases standing on the construct of interest) might
prevail. This expectation is based on the robust evidence in favor
of the so-called testing effect in the cognitive and educational
testing literatures (see above). It would also be interesting for
future research to test the viability of our models in the personality
domain. For instance, there is ample evidence that test takers’
answers become more reliable when they retake a personality
inventory. This finding might be explained either by bias being
present in the first examination or by better self-presentation in the
second administration (i.e., increased self-schema clarity; see
Hamilton & Shuminsky, 1990; Knowles, 1988; Steinberg, 1994).
As our models (see Figure 1) are related to these explanations, they
can be fruitfully applied to this domain. However, any retesting in
the personality domain also needs to be concerned with changes in
intentional distortion from the initial to the retest situation.
We caution that our results need to be replicated for other
cognitive ability tests, in other samples, and in other settings
before policy makers draw firm conclusions or form policies.
Note, too, that our results were obtained for a specific cognitive
ability test in a specific operational setting (educational context in
Belgium). In addition, it is important to acknowledge a potential
confound in this study. Although the specific set of items we
examined was identical across occasions, the larger battery in
which they were embedded changed. It is possible that the finding
of between-occasions measurement bias could be attributed to this
contextual difference. Although this is a concern, it cannot explain
the entire pattern of results obtained across all the analyses (i.e.,
this would not explain the consistent pattern of decreases in
correlations with g-loaded variables and the increase in the corre-
lation with memory). Additionally, it should be noted that GPA
served as our only work-oriented criterion, and we only had two
other external correlates. Future research should continue to ex-
pand the nexus of external correlates, including g-loaded job
performance criteria.
This study also offers important methodological contributions.
First, we examined measurement and predictive bias due to retest-
ing within a latent construct framework. Although the results of the
observed score and latent construct approaches (cf. Table 1 and the
other tables) point in the same direction, the advantages of the
latent construct approach lies primarily in the quality of informa-
tion provided. When researchers examine retest effects at the
observed level, they basically have to guess what caused the
effects, running the risk of misattributing the differences found.
For example, as compared to the latent variable analyses, the
inspection of mean score differences and validity differences in
Table 1 does not provide any meaningful information about the
reasons why retest effects occurred or why the predictive validity
decreased. Instead, a latent construct approach allows for the
explicit test of differences in measurement properties prior to
comparison of initial and retest scores. By linking the MI tests to
possible explanations of retest effects, researchers have a much
more fine-grained approach for testing hypothesized causes behind
retest effects. For example, in this study, evidence of metric and
uniqueness bias across occasions enabled us to discount the first
explanation for retest effects (see Figure 1).
Second, this study demonstrates the complexity of retest effects.
Retesting in this case appeared to alter the measurement properties
of the set of indicators, apparently because of a change in the
substantive nature of the variance assessed by those indicators.
This finding suggests that a true understanding of retest effects
requires not just a latent variable analysis but a latent variable
analysis based on a wide set of various indicators to model g
variance, non-g variance, and noncognitive variance. In the current
study, the operational test was too brief to allow for the full
assessment of a wide range of general and narrow abilities. By way
of contrast, Reeve and Lam (2005), who administered a more
comprehensive battery and modeled the variance due to both
general and narrow abilities, failed to find any evidence of mea-
surement bias across three testing occasions. They did, however,
find that the variance of the memory factor increased across
occasions. It is possible that the discrepancy between the current
study’s findings and Reeve and Lam’s results is a function of the
number and type of ability factors modeled. Said differently, it is
possible that retesting alters the meaning of observed scores (as
shown in the current study) but that invariant estimates of g can be
obtained if one can accurately model a broader range of narrow
abilities. Clearly, our interpretation is only a supposition at this
point, but the differences in these two studies may point the way
for future research on retest effects. Moreover, we believe this
exemplifies the need for the continuation of both lab-based and
field-based research on retest effects.
Finally, we encourage researchers to consider other perspectives
on retesting (e.g., the candidate’s perspective). The current study
only speaks to the psychometric implications of retesting. How-
ever, formulation of retesting policies should consider a broader
set of outcomes. Personnel scholars have long noted the distinction
between psychometric bias (a statistical concept) and fairness (a
social concept). In addition to calling for more research on the
psychometric implications of retesting, we note that there is vir-
tually no research investigating fairness perceptions or other ap-
plicant reactions to the various aspects of retesting policies.
Conclusion
This study moves beyond documenting changes in mean ob-
served scores on retesting and toward an understanding of the
psychometric implications of these changes. By using a latent
variable approach, we found that retesting induced both measure-
ment and predictive bias. Specifically, our analyses suggest that
retesting resulted in increases in the degree to which the test items
assessed non-g test-specific skills (e.g., memory) and a decrease in
the g loadings of the items. We hope that this study’s methodology
and results encourage researchers to further scrutinize possible
causes behind retest effects and practitioners to critically consider
the potential implications of retesting.
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